Monday, May 3, 2010

The Performance of Food Art

I don't know if anyone still follows this blog, but I see no harm in posting as I see fit. I was browsing the New York Times today, and came across this interesting article about a piece of food "performance art."

A quick google search brought me to the artist's website, linked here:

To pull a few quotes from her bio section:
Jennifer Rubell creates participatory large-scale food projects that are a hybrid of performance art, installation art, and happenings. Often taking place inside a traditional art-world occasion -- gala dinner, opening night, gallery opening – her work deconstructs the meal or ritual, and reshapes it into a series of installations that prompt participants to partake without any instruction or guidance...

The projects fulfill the essential functions of the event itself while completely ignoring classic order, format and service. The event often unfolds in a series of spaces, through a series of installations that engage with the history of modern and contemporary art while at the same time providing food, drink, and wonder.


I can recall a time when I would scoff at such assertions and dismiss works like Rubell's as not art, but merely a stunt trying to play itself off as art, but now, I am not so sure. While I still insist that Jackson Pollack and Damien Hirst are not artists proper (rather, they are confidence artists, distorting the meaning of art for purely selfish goals), I see some merit and value in Rubell's works.

I shall leave a question for any who care to explore it: do Rubell's works, "performance pieces using food," fit into a traditional definition of art? Are works such as hers useful for exploring and understanding our natures? Or is it merely fun, a lesser sort of "decorative art," unfit to be put into the same category as the "high arts" of painting, sculpture, and classical music?

Thursday, January 28, 2010

Exactly What They Deserve

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/8486359.stm?ls

Personally, I think this guy's got the right idea. And that he should add more Damien Hirst pieces. To my knowledge, a great number of Hirst's pieces involve no direct involvement from him. He is a "conceptual artist," that is, he conceives the idea, commissions real artists to make it, and takes all the credit (and reaps the obscene profits of modern "art").

Though this begs the question: is there something aesthetic in the destruction of bad art? Is this pile of destroyed art pieces a work of art, itself?

My knee jerk reaction is to say, "no, it's merely what most modern 'art' deserves." But then I come to the question of what "Art" truly is. Could it be manifest in this destruction of artworks?

As a side note, I want to keep an eye on this... I'm curious as to whether Hirst will sue this artist for destroying his work.

Sunday, December 6, 2009

Carroll's Response to Gaut

As you may recall from our readings on horror, one of Gaut's critiques of Carroll was that Carroll's definition discounts the existence of horror movies where the "monster" is actually human. He cited "The Silence of the Lambs" as an example of what is clearly a horror movie without a monster. He also brought up the hypothetical example of a person who comes from a horror movie, saying that it wasn't scary.

In his article "Enjoying Horror Fictions: A Response to Gaut," printed in the British Journal of Aesthetics, Carroll responds to both of these claims. (For those interested in reading the full article, it can be found by searching through Freel Library's listing of journals. I accessed the text via "Academic OneFile.")

In brief, his arguments are follows: Hannibal Lector is a monster, because he, and other psychotic killers depicted in slasher films, "constitute science fictions of the mind." They do not suffer real psychoses, but fictionally enhanced versions of psychoses, taking them from the realm of science to science fiction, and thus monsters, defending his monster hypothesis.

As for Gaut's example of Norman, the man who claims the film wasn't frightening, Carroll has this to say: "On the basis of my own -- admittedly unscientific -- sample of such pronouncements, I think that, when they are assessed contextually, these assertions (generally uttered by men, especially adolescent men) most often mean 'I'm too tough to be moved by something like that'."

He goes on to cite the commercial success of the movie (and preceding novel) Jurassic Park, and the success of the horror novels of Stephen King, to suggest that it is not an atypical person who consumes horror fiction, or a typical person in an atypical situation, but that they are, again, fascinated by monsters.

To end with a question: Do you feel that Carroll's response to Gaut adequately addresses the objections he raised? Why?

Art and Aesthetics

At his talk on Wednesday, Tom Wartenberg made a very interesting point about aesthetics and art. In short: "Aesthetics is what's visually pleasing. It's how we aesthetically enjoy nature. Not everything that we appreciate aesthetically is art, and in addition, not all art is aesthetic. Some art we appreciate for what it does for us, how it makes us think, rather than how it looks." I do not purport to claim that these were his exact words, but I believe this was the gist of it, if I recall correctly (anyone who was there, feel free to correct me in a comment if I misrepresented his view).

I find this view to be quite interesting. I had started my considerations of art and aesthetics from the premise that all art objects are aesthetic objects, that art objects are a subset of the category of items that we appreciate aesthetically.

Let us take this view and play it out. Some modern art certainly seems to lack any aesthetic value. I will take as my example Jeremijenko's Tree Logic at Mass MoCA (feel free to debate me on the aesthetic value of this "piece."). There is, to my estimation, no aesthetic value in hanging trees upside down, and yet this is on display in an art museum. Indeed, it may well be considered art despite its lack of aesthetic value (I will leave the contention of good vs bad art for another time).

This, I think, might give yet more credence to Weitz's argument that we cannot define art, that we cannot identify a conclusive list of necessary AND sufficient conditions.

To end on a list of questions:
1) Is "Tree Logic" art? Why?
2) Might it be possible to coin a definition of art that has the necessary and sufficient conditions to allow such diverse pieces as, say, "The Mona Lisa," Bethoveen's symphonies, and "Tree Logic" to all fall in to the category of art?
3) What might be some qualities that would allow a work to be art if it lacks aesthetic considerations, and how might these qualities differentiate the artwork from non-art works that share those qualities?

Wednesday, December 2, 2009

The Importance of Art in School

Tania asked: "In our country will it ever be the case that more schools rally harder to keep their art programs or will they always be the first to go?"

For the purpose of answering this question, I will assume you mean schools below the college level, and I will address my answer to elementary and middle schools in particular, and high schools to a lesser extent.

Much as I hate to say this, I think that, for the foreseeable future, the answer will be the latter. Particularly in today's economy, with budgets being slashed across the board, I sincerely doubt that many, if any, schools will fight to keep art programs at the expense of "core education" -- math, science, social studies, English. I do not like to admit this, but it's an unfortunate fact that many schools see art, and even to some extent recess, as merely frivolous, and unnecessary to the development of the child or the person.

To end with a question: Is participation in the arts from an early age beneficial to the development of a child?

Violence Depicted in Role Play

Jaimie asked: "What do you make of violent role-play pornography and erotica where the participants are not actually being harmed but violent scenarios are depicted through fantasy? Is this harmful to human development?"

I do not think that this type of pornography is harmful to human development. Quite the opposite, in fact. Access to this type of material, where violent acts are carried out in a fictional setting, is, I think, beneficial to humanity.

How could this be the case? Pornography and erotica of this type, where acts like rape and sadomasochism are played out through fantasy, serve a unique role for people who might be driven towards these types of fantasies. The disturbed individual who would rape will do this no matter what. But the relatively functioning individual who just happens to want to be spanked, or whip another person, can find an outlet in this type of pornography or erotica, and thus satiate the desire without harming anyone.

I rather liken it to violent video games in this regard. The disturbed individual will commit violence whether they play them or not, but "normal" individuals can use them as an outlet for the violent tendencies that we all share (like it or not). It is certainly less harmful to society for a person to steal a car and rob a bank in the Grand Theft Auto video game than for this person to go out and commit these acts in the real world.

To end with a question: What factor do you think differentiates "pornography" and "erotica?"

Sunday, November 22, 2009

Role-Playing Games

Betsy asked: "Do you think that some, many, or most, of the individuals who utilize Role-Playing Games do so in a healthy or obsessive manner?"

First, we must clarify what we are talking about. Role-Playing Games can come in a variety of media. First, there is the table-top RPG, the most classic example of which being, of course, Dungeons and Dragons. Second, we have the single-player video game RPG, perhaps most famously the Final Fantasy series of games. Third, there is the more recent phenomenon of the Massive Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game, or MMORPG, perhaps most famously (or infamously) associated with the game World of Warcraft. There is also, of course, LARP, or Live Action Role Play. I will not address this final one, as it is not something I have ever participated in.

To answer the question, I will draw on my experience with the first three types of RPG's I mentioned, as well as what I know of other players of these games. I think I can safely say that most people who play these games do so in a healthy manner. Table-top RPG's in particular provide a creative outlet for the players, allowing them to assume a new identity and think as their character while playing out the story laid out by the Game Master (GM). They encourage social interaction within a setting.

Single-player video game RPG's serve as both tests of skill (these games often include puzzles that challenge problem-solving skills, and a variety of creatures to battle that require one learning different tactics for each), as well as an interactive story, which can often include shades of moral grey areas. Playing through a well-written RPG can have a similar effect to reading a good novel.

The MMORPG plays a unique role. Most are, in essence, a table-top RPG put online, with the notable difference between the first two of a lack of an overarching story. MMORPG's typically have an open world setting with quests that can be undertaken(and repeated ad infinitum) by the player, often in groups of other players. Most players, from my experience, will either play the games to pass the time when they are bored or to relax after finishing work (be it school work or an actual job). These can have a social aspect, as through interaction, players can form friendships with other players.

This is not to suggest that there are not people who play these excessively. For example, I have heard numerous anecdotes of people failing out of school or losing jobs because of a pathological obsession with playing World of Warcraft, and there are plenty of parodies of people who take D&D too seriously. However, these obsessive players are not typical of the people who play these games. The actions of these few fringe elements do not reflect accurately upon the vast majority of players of these games.

To end with a question: Trading card games, such as Magic: the Gathering, often commission artists to create original artwork for their cards. Would these pieces, commissioned specifically to appear on a trading card, be considered works of art? Would the cards on which the artwork appears be considered works of art, themselves? Or the trading card game taken as a whole?

"Negative" Emotions

Having just reread Gaut's article to refresh my memory for Monday's class, I would like to take a brief moment to examine his thesis.

Gaut's argument essentially comes out to the following: the so-called "negative" emotions are only unpleasant in their typical applications. Under atypical circumstances, they are not necessarily unpleasant, and even enjoyable. Thus, for example, we may legitimately find fear unpleasant when we are being robbed at gunpoint, when our lives are in very real danger, but we may enjoy fear when watching a horror movie, which is presented in a context in which no real danger, the "typical" circumstance of the emotion being felt, exists.

I feel that this argument not only provides a very powerful response to Carroll's article, but rings true to human emotions and mentality. This thesis can clearly apply not only to horror, but to tragedy. It successfully removes the seeming paradox of the enjoyment of these "negative" emotions by a critical evaluation of the circumstances under which these emotions are felt.

To end with a question: Gaut casually throws out, on page 320, that "the majority of horror works lack any serious artistic worth. They are pure entertainment." This seems to suggest that art does not entertain, or, at the very least, that something that is meant purely to entertain cannot have any artistic merit. Is this the case? Or have I misinterpreted this passage?

Sunday, November 15, 2009

The Benefits of Fiction

Jacob asked: "Since we can suffer by exposure to certain fictions and non-fiction, can we equally benefit from others?"

I think the answer to this question is a resounding "yes." The Greeks performed tragedies for just this purpose. The audience would watch the play, and though they all know the story, they would feel for the characters. With this act of empathy, at the close of the play, the audience would experience a "catharsis," a cleansing of the emotions.

In my own experience, and the experiences of others I have talked to, reading fiction and watching movies does just this. They serve as outlets for us to come to grips with our emotions. Action movies appeal to the instinct for violence, and suppress it, allowing us to experience the carnage through the characters so we do not have to. Romance novels and movies stand as surrogates for passion, allowing us to experience with the characters the thrill of pursuing a lover, the bitterness of rejection, and the final sweetness of finding true love. Horror movies allow us to face our fears, give us license to be scared in a society where showing fear is seen as a sign of weakness.

These emotions that we feel are real, and the medium of fiction grants us a safe outlet through which to release our emotions so we are not overwhelmed by them. These emotions are real, and that, in part, explains why we enjoy them so much. They give us a sense of relief to have been able to express these emotions in a socially acceptable outlet.

To end with a (completely unrelated) question: Might video games be considered potential works of art?

Saturday, November 14, 2009

Dawn Phillips' Article

I did a bit of research this evening after I was reminded of the incredibly disappointing article by Dawn Phillips. I found this: http://www.dawnphillips.co.uk/Publications%20pdf%20files/Dawn%20M%20Phillips%20-%20The%20real%20challenge%20for%20an%20aesthetics%20of%20photography.pdf



I was rather surprised when I read this. The article included in our book is considered an "excerpt," but I do not think these two pieces are comparable. In the full version above, Phillips makes an actual (and, I think, rather good, if not complete) argument for photography actually being an art form.

Granted, the full article feels more like an outline for a potential argument than an argument in and of itself, but the full piece seems, to me, to be much stronger than the "excerpt" printed in our book (even if it is still lacking).

To end with a question: why do you suppose the authors of our textbook chose to print the version of Phillips' article that appears in our textbook, rather than the version presented above?

Monday, November 2, 2009

Photographic Representation

One point I particularly took issue with from Scruton is his claim that photographs cannot represent anything. I submit, therefore, this photograph, paradigmatic of the Great Depression:



On it's face, it seems to be simply an image. But it is more than that. It is a representation of the spirit of the times. The woman's expression as she stares off into the distance, her abject depression, is representative of the feel that there was no end in sight of the hard times that had befallen America. The two children hide their heads from the camera, because there is no silver lining to the dark cloud of the depression. Their faces are hidden; they do not wish to look upon the dark prospects of the future.

This photograph, and it IS a photograph, is certainly representative. It was the photographer's intention to capture this spirit of the time. Therefore, Scruton's claim that photography "cannot represent anything" seems to fly right in the face of the truth in actual photography -- the truth that photography CAN, and DOES, represent things beyond the objects pictured, in the same way that a painting can and does represent something outside of itself.

To end with a question: Given this example against Scruton's definition of an "ideal photograph," and the fact that his argument was based entirely on his "ideal examples," does Scruton's argument still hold true?

Scruton's Definition of Photography

Scruton takes a position that, I think, is self-defeating. It is such in that his definition of photography is too narrow.

Scruton claims that photography is simply the act of taking the picture. Anything that comes before or after that is the manipulation of photography, and thus not photography. The issue comes when he tries to draw his analogy to painting.

Before a painter can paint, there is some necessary prep work that MUST BE DONE. The canvas must be prepared, and perhaps primed. The paints need to be mixed while working, and even after, there is some fine editing to be done before a painting is truly complete. These, I think, would be the analogues to the preparation of a setting for a photograph and later editing on the image.

I would like to believe that Scruton does not confuse the final product of painting with the entire act of painting. If this is the case, than rejecting the analogues to the processes required to make a painting and calling this the "ideal photograph" is at best a blind mistake, and at worse manipulation of the facts, selectively ignoring facts to build a world view that is entirely independent of, and contrary to, reality.

I feel that his argument is the equivalent of comparing apples and oranges. Scruton writes off some properties of oranges, uses others to show that an orange is not an apple, and then concludes that an orange is not a fruit, but an apple is, based solely on the grounds that an orange is not an apple. This is a flawed argument to make, and discounts the properties that apples and oranges share, i.e. growing on trees, containing seeds, having an edible flesh surrounding the seeds, etc.

To end with a question: As mentioned in class, when trying to use an ideal to make a point, there is the real risk of using a wrong example and taking the essence of that as the ideal. Given this danger, is there any practical value in trying to use an ideal as the basis of an argument to discredit the real world?

Sunday, November 1, 2009

"Levels" of Art

Jacob asked the following: "Telfer attributed food as a minor art, and Scruton thinks that photography is a lesser art form. Are there levels of art? Are some forms inherently better than others or is all art, or rather, all artforms equal?"

The simple answer is, "no." For a longer answer... there are numerous difficulties with this idea of a "lesser" versus "greater" arts.

For one, it is presumptuous to pick out particular art forms and say that one is better than another. Each different art form has a different tradition, and look for different aspects, so in a sense, trying to categorize "lesser" and "greater" art is like comparing apples to oranges. They're both fruit, but there's no way to argue that one is "better" than another.

Another difficulty is that there is such variation within different artistic "types." For example, I would argue that John Cage's 4'33 is certainly less accomplished than, say, Vivaldi's Four Seasons. It seems ludicrous, therefore, to consider a "song" where the musician merely sits at the piano for 4 minutes and 33 seconds would necessarily be a better work of art than, say, a photograph, simply because John Cage's piece is "music," and thus a "greater" art than the "lesser art" of photography.

Given this large variation of skill, it is absurd to try to differentiate art forms as "greater" or "lesser." Rather, I would suggest that art works be judged solely on their merit, lest we mistake a poor piece of one type of art to be better than a great piece of a different type simply because of the types of art these works are examples of.

To end with a question: Is Scruton justified in his use of "Ideal examples" to build his case against photography?

NaNoWriMo

This will not be one of my two posts for the week for aesthetics. I just wanted to put in a quick advertisement for National Novel Writing Month (NaNoWriMo). Granted, it's already started, but it's not too late yet, if you can play catch up, and it's a fun experience for anyone (not just writers!).

http://www.nanowrimo.org/

The object of NaNoWriMo is to write a 50,000 word novel in 30 days, just to prove you can. I highly recommend you all look in to it. It's quite fun. I won in 2008, and am participating again this year. Good luck to anyone who tries this with me!

Aesthetics of Nature

I feel that Jacob's post on aesthetics and the aesthetic appreciation of nature fairly well encapsulates my own view on the aesthetic appreciation of nature, so I will not go in to detail in that here. In sum, his argument is, "aesthetic responses are emotional responses to what we see," therefore when we have an emotional response to our perception of nature, it is an aesthetic response. I would like to use this post to suggest something that Carlson found problematic: we do not know what to appreciate aesthetically in regards to nature.

I believe that this question is a very simple one to answer. It can be answered thus: whatever sense is most useful at the time. This may seem vague, but a few examples should serve to illustrate the point.

Let us take the classic example of the waterfall to begin with. Part of the aesthetic experience would certainly be seeing it. The act of watching the water rushing ever downwards can be quite an emotional ride. It is compounded by the sound, the mighty roar of the water as it cascades downward. Feel, scent, and perhaps even taste may come in to play depending on distance from the base, as a result of the mist that sometimes rises up at the base of waterfalls.

For another example, take a walk through the woods. Part of the aesthetic experience is, again, visual, in terms of the flora and fauna that one may spot on the trail. Aural comes in to play through experiences such as the rustle of leaves by a breeze, or the song of birds. The air itself can provide an aesthetic experience, if it is clean. Feel can come through touching trees along the way, or simply from the act of walking on the often soft ground of a forest.

A favorite example of mine is lying in a yard cloud-gazing. The visual experience is, of course, looking up at the sky. Aural experience can be in the same vein as the forest -- breeze and birdsong, for example. The physical experience is the feel of the grass on one's back, perhaps the feel of bugs crawling across the skin, or the warmth of the sun's light.

In all cases, it is not particularly difficult to find which sense to use. It is simply a matter of being open to receiving the stimuli that nature has to offer. There need be no "set in stone" way to aesthetically appreciate nature.

To end with a question: Do we really need to "know" how to aesthetically appreciate something?

Sunday, October 25, 2009

Performing Arts and Performances

Jacob asked: "is there a way to distinguish a performing art from the performance? Can a dance exist without being danced?"

This question brings up some intriguing discussion points, particularly where morality stands. As I may have made clear before, my own view on morality is that an art object is amoral, as only actions can have a moral aspect to them. This would seem to imply that there is, in fact, a way for a performance, as an action, to be moral or immoral.

I do not believe that this is the case, that a performance can be moral or immoral. After all, a performance is merely the acting out of directions given by another. The particular actions of a performer while performing may be immoral, but this does not make the performance itself immoral.

How can this distinction be made? A performance is a presentation of a work of art. In this sense, the performance itself is no different than the display of a painting or sculpture. It is a unique presentation in and of itself, and is therefore just as much an amoral object for aesthetic appreciation as the painting or sculpture.

The question of improvisation falls in to this same category. It is a display of a work of art, and is, in and of itself, amoral. I shall return to this later in regards to Jacob's second question.

However, the particular actions of a performer can be moral or immoral, just as the affects of a work on an audience can be moral or immoral while keeping the piece itself amoral. If, for example, a play calls for the rape of a character, and the actor playing the rapist, during the performance, actually rapes the actor playing the rape victim, this particular action on the part of the actor playing the rapist is immoral, but this does not make the play, or the performance, immoral.

What of improvisation in terms of Jacob's second question? "Can a dance exist without being danced," or, in a similar vein, can an improvised jazz performance exist without being performed? The simple answer to this is, "yes, it can." However, it is not a work of art until it is performed. In the same way, a painting can exist in the artist's mind, but it does not exist as a work of art until the artist actually paints it.

To end with a question: Does the intention behind a work to act as a stimulant for a particular response, i.e. emotional or physical, preclude the possibility that it has aesthetic and artistic merit?

Thursday, October 22, 2009

Does Philosophy Help Us "See?"

Professor Yake brought up what I found to be an interesting point in Wednesday's class: the idea that philosophy should help us "see," in a literal sense.

My initial reaction to this was, "anyone with two functioning eyes can 'see' just fine, thank you. Philosophy helps us interpret what we see, and find the meaning in and behind the visual stimuli. It helps us 'see' in the sense of understanding, as well it should."

But then I started thinking about this. Could training in perception be helpful? It is certainly a possibility. It may be quite useful to learn new ways of physically seeing things, in order to give us a new perspective from which to analyze and interpret that object. Is philosophy the subject that should concern itself with this? Perhaps. Though the question would then become, "how might we learn to 'see' differently?"

So, I beg the question: how might philosophy be able to teach us to "see?" Can it? Should it?

Tuesday, October 20, 2009

"Aesthetic Objects" and "Art Objects"

I would like to present, for your rational evaluation, a theory I have developed concerning "art objects" and "aesthetic objects."

An "aesthetic object" is any object which elicits an aesthetic, or emotional, response from the viewer.

An "art object" is an object created by a human being with the intention to elicit an aesthetic, or emotional, response from the viewer.

Under this theory, "art objects" is a sub-category of the larger category of "aesthetic objects." The implication is that, first and foremost, for an object to be considered an "art object," it must first pass the test of "aesthetic object." If the object in question does not elicit an emotional response from the viewer, it has failed as art, and therefore IS NOT art, regardless of the intentions of the creator.

Only when an art object passes the test of being an "aesthetic object," thus showing it possesses aesthetic qualities, can we then evaluate the work's merit as an "art object," which would include such aspects as the artist's intention, the technique, the originality of the piece, authenticity, etc. Key here is that high AESTHETIC merit does not necessarily translate in to high ARTISTIC merit. Thus, under this construction, a forgery can have equal aesthetic merit to the original which was copied, but the forgery would have significantly lower artistic value.

To be explicit with my ending question: What do you think of this construction? Does it have merit?

Monday, October 19, 2009

"Rational Morality," and Art

In today's class, Professor Yake brought up a very interesting point about "rational morality." I would like to comment on it here.

I like the implications behind this idea of "rational morality." It seems, to me, to speak to the idea that we should question all of our assumptions, and only keep those for which we can find a rational basis. This, to me, is a view of high merit, for anyone. There is never any harm in exploring the roots of our views and having a solid foundation for holding what values we do hold.

I think, however, that trying to then apply this "rational morality" to art gets rocky. Art, in my view, does not exist solely as an expression of morality or moral living. Rather, art can, and should, reflect the realities of our lives. This is extremely important, as often, we can be blind to the reality around us, and fail to notice the proverbial elephant in the room.

To illustrate this point of cultural blindness, I'll draw an example from a course I took over the summer. In our society today, heterosexuality is so pervasive in all strata of social functioning, that it is considered to be the "norm" by which we judge everything else. This manifests itself in many ways. A famous example are the "coming out stories" we expect of, for example, homosexuals. Heterosexuality is so prevalent that there need be no explanation for the "discovery" of one's heterosexuality, but society demands a story, a reason, for one's "homosexuality."

In the same vein of the "heterosexual invisible" would be the rituals of marriage. This concept of marriage, of the wife in a white dress, the father giving the bride to the husband, etc, is so ingrained in our cultural consciousness that many, if not most, people are unaware of the historical symbolism behind the symbolism. The white dress is a symbol of the bride's virginity (which is questionable in today's society, and almost certainly so in the case of remarriages). The father giving the bride away is representative of the social view of women as property -- a woman is her father's property until she is married, at which point she becomes her husband's property, making the entire marriage ceremony a celebration of what is, at its core, a financial transaction.

How does this all relate to art? Simple. Art can, and should, function to expose such things to our larger cultural consciousness. Art is a perfect vehicle for revealing these sorts of truths that have become lost to the culture, and thus a great potential catalyst for social change where change is needed.

Hooray for interdisciplinary analogies! :)

... and now that I've just used a smiley in a graded blog, I shall end with a question: Should art serve as a "mirror to society," revealing the flaws in our society that we are often unconscious of, or should art restrict itself to utopian depictions of "high morality?"

Art "Inducing Immorality," and Racism in Art

I'm going to be blogging like crazy this week. I can already see that.

I'm going to tackle the topics in my title in reverse order. First, "racism" in art. It was brought up today that, a while back, there was a cartoon which depicted Obama as a monkey. I would like to begin by pointing out the hundreds, if not thousands, of depictions of our previous president, George W. Bush, as a monkey. The man looks like one, and he's about as civilized as one. The point here is that political cartoons, to make a point, characterize politicians as animals. This is not new, and therefore I do not consider the cartoon in question to be anything other than politics, or political cartoons, as usual.

Does this make the political cartoons somehow reprehensible? Perhaps. But I would contest that despite this, the artist has a right to produce it, just as the viewers have the right to be offended by it. Anything beyond that goes in to dangerous territory.

So, tying in to the idea of art "inducing immorality..." Professor Yake brought up a hypothetical porn movie, but I would like to take a real-world example: the film "The Triumph of the Will." "The Triumph of the Will" is arguably one of the most famous, and successful, propaganda films in history. It portrays the rise of the Nazi party as a revitalization of Germany, and casts Hitler into an almost-Messianic role for the German people. It served to solidify Hitler's popularity in Germany, and secure his position as Fuhrer of the so-called 'Third Reich.'

It is no secret that Hitler commissioned the mass slaughter of millions of innocents. The propaganda film "The Triumph of the Will" was certainly a powerful tool in building popular support for a government and ideology that is near-universally accepted today as pure evil. There is no way a rational human being can honestly legitimize the murder of millions of innocents (numbers which, incidentally, included a large number of my own relatives on my paternal side). However, despite the fact that "The Triumph of the Will" glorified this government and the man who would ultimately unleash one of the most destructive wars of the twentieth century, can we really call the film itself "immoral?" I do not think this is the case.

Why? The intentions of the film maker may have been immoral -- the glorification of Hitler. Hitler's intentions were almost certainly immoral -- "Endlösung," or the Final Solution, a policy that lead to the murder of millions of Jews. This does not, however, impose this immorality on the film. An object is inherently amoral. Morality refers to actions, to conduct, and perhaps to a lesser extent to ideas, but cannot, and should not, be afixed to objects, art objects included.

To end with a couple of questions: 1) Does a common tactic in political cartoons become racist when the politician being lampooned happens to be of an "ethnic minority?" 2) Is there any way to legitimately apply moral judgments to human creations?