Carroll's Response to Gaut

As you may recall from our readings on horror, one of Gaut's critiques of Carroll was that Carroll's definition discounts the existence of horror movies where the "monster" is actually human. He cited "The Silence of the Lambs" as an example of what is clearly a horror movie without a monster. He also brought up the hypothetical example of a person who comes from a horror movie, saying that it wasn't scary.

In his article "Enjoying Horror Fictions: A Response to Gaut," printed in the British Journal of Aesthetics, Carroll responds to both of these claims. (For those interested in reading the full article, it can be found by searching through Freel Library's listing of journals. I accessed the text via "Academic OneFile.")

In brief, his arguments are follows: Hannibal Lector is a monster, because he, and other psychotic killers depicted in slasher films, "constitute science fictions of the mind." They do not suffer real psychoses, but fictionally enhanced versions of psychoses, taking them from the realm of science to science fiction, and thus monsters, defending his monster hypothesis.

As for Gaut's example of Norman, the man who claims the film wasn't frightening, Carroll has this to say: "On the basis of my own -- admittedly unscientific -- sample of such pronouncements, I think that, when they are assessed contextually, these assertions (generally uttered by men, especially adolescent men) most often mean 'I'm too tough to be moved by something like that'."

He goes on to cite the commercial success of the movie (and preceding novel) Jurassic Park, and the success of the horror novels of Stephen King, to suggest that it is not an atypical person who consumes horror fiction, or a typical person in an atypical situation, but that they are, again, fascinated by monsters.

To end with a question: Do you feel that Carroll's response to Gaut adequately addresses the objections he raised? Why?

Art and Aesthetics

At his talk on Wednesday, Tom Wartenberg made a very interesting point about aesthetics and art. In short: "Aesthetics is what's visually pleasing. It's how we aesthetically enjoy nature. Not everything that we appreciate aesthetically is art, and in addition, not all art is aesthetic. Some art we appreciate for what it does for us, how it makes us think, rather than how it looks." I do not purport to claim that these were his exact words, but I believe this was the gist of it, if I recall correctly (anyone who was there, feel free to correct me in a comment if I misrepresented his view).

I find this view to be quite interesting. I had started my considerations of art and aesthetics from the premise that all art objects are aesthetic objects, that art objects are a subset of the category of items that we appreciate aesthetically.

Let us take this view and play it out. Some modern art certainly seems to lack any aesthetic value. I will take as my example Jeremijenko's Tree Logic at Mass MoCA (feel free to debate me on the aesthetic value of this "piece."). There is, to my estimation, no aesthetic value in hanging trees upside down, and yet this is on display in an art museum. Indeed, it may well be considered art despite its lack of aesthetic value (I will leave the contention of good vs bad art for another time).

This, I think, might give yet more credence to Weitz's argument that we cannot define art, that we cannot identify a conclusive list of necessary AND sufficient conditions.

To end on a list of questions:
1) Is "Tree Logic" art? Why?
2) Might it be possible to coin a definition of art that has the necessary and sufficient conditions to allow such diverse pieces as, say, "The Mona Lisa," Bethoveen's symphonies, and "Tree Logic" to all fall in to the category of art?
3) What might be some qualities that would allow a work to be art if it lacks aesthetic considerations, and how might these qualities differentiate the artwork from non-art works that share those qualities?

The Importance of Art in School

Tania asked: "In our country will it ever be the case that more schools rally harder to keep their art programs or will they always be the first to go?"

For the purpose of answering this question, I will assume you mean schools below the college level, and I will address my answer to elementary and middle schools in particular, and high schools to a lesser extent.

Much as I hate to say this, I think that, for the foreseeable future, the answer will be the latter. Particularly in today's economy, with budgets being slashed across the board, I sincerely doubt that many, if any, schools will fight to keep art programs at the expense of "core education" -- math, science, social studies, English. I do not like to admit this, but it's an unfortunate fact that many schools see art, and even to some extent recess, as merely frivolous, and unnecessary to the development of the child or the person.

To end with a question: Is participation in the arts from an early age beneficial to the development of a child?

Violence Depicted in Role Play

Jaimie asked: "What do you make of violent role-play pornography and erotica where the participants are not actually being harmed but violent scenarios are depicted through fantasy? Is this harmful to human development?"

I do not think that this type of pornography is harmful to human development. Quite the opposite, in fact. Access to this type of material, where violent acts are carried out in a fictional setting, is, I think, beneficial to humanity.

How could this be the case? Pornography and erotica of this type, where acts like rape and sadomasochism are played out through fantasy, serve a unique role for people who might be driven towards these types of fantasies. The disturbed individual who would rape will do this no matter what. But the relatively functioning individual who just happens to want to be spanked, or whip another person, can find an outlet in this type of pornography or erotica, and thus satiate the desire without harming anyone.

I rather liken it to violent video games in this regard. The disturbed individual will commit violence whether they play them or not, but "normal" individuals can use them as an outlet for the violent tendencies that we all share (like it or not). It is certainly less harmful to society for a person to steal a car and rob a bank in the Grand Theft Auto video game than for this person to go out and commit these acts in the real world.

To end with a question: What factor do you think differentiates "pornography" and "erotica?"

Role-Playing Games

Betsy asked: "Do you think that some, many, or most, of the individuals who utilize Role-Playing Games do so in a healthy or obsessive manner?"

First, we must clarify what we are talking about. Role-Playing Games can come in a variety of media. First, there is the table-top RPG, the most classic example of which being, of course, Dungeons and Dragons. Second, we have the single-player video game RPG, perhaps most famously the Final Fantasy series of games. Third, there is the more recent phenomenon of the Massive Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game, or MMORPG, perhaps most famously (or infamously) associated with the game World of Warcraft. There is also, of course, LARP, or Live Action Role Play. I will not address this final one, as it is not something I have ever participated in.

To answer the question, I will draw on my experience with the first three types of RPG's I mentioned, as well as what I know of other players of these games. I think I can safely say that most people who play these games do so in a healthy manner. Table-top RPG's in particular provide a creative outlet for the players, allowing them to assume a new identity and think as their character while playing out the story laid out by the Game Master (GM). They encourage social interaction within a setting.

Single-player video game RPG's serve as both tests of skill (these games often include puzzles that challenge problem-solving skills, and a variety of creatures to battle that require one learning different tactics for each), as well as an interactive story, which can often include shades of moral grey areas. Playing through a well-written RPG can have a similar effect to reading a good novel.

The MMORPG plays a unique role. Most are, in essence, a table-top RPG put online, with the notable difference between the first two of a lack of an overarching story. MMORPG's typically have an open world setting with quests that can be undertaken(and repeated ad infinitum) by the player, often in groups of other players. Most players, from my experience, will either play the games to pass the time when they are bored or to relax after finishing work (be it school work or an actual job). These can have a social aspect, as through interaction, players can form friendships with other players.

This is not to suggest that there are not people who play these excessively. For example, I have heard numerous anecdotes of people failing out of school or losing jobs because of a pathological obsession with playing World of Warcraft, and there are plenty of parodies of people who take D&D too seriously. However, these obsessive players are not typical of the people who play these games. The actions of these few fringe elements do not reflect accurately upon the vast majority of players of these games.

To end with a question: Trading card games, such as Magic: the Gathering, often commission artists to create original artwork for their cards. Would these pieces, commissioned specifically to appear on a trading card, be considered works of art? Would the cards on which the artwork appears be considered works of art, themselves? Or the trading card game taken as a whole?

"Negative" Emotions

Having just reread Gaut's article to refresh my memory for Monday's class, I would like to take a brief moment to examine his thesis.

Gaut's argument essentially comes out to the following: the so-called "negative" emotions are only unpleasant in their typical applications. Under atypical circumstances, they are not necessarily unpleasant, and even enjoyable. Thus, for example, we may legitimately find fear unpleasant when we are being robbed at gunpoint, when our lives are in very real danger, but we may enjoy fear when watching a horror movie, which is presented in a context in which no real danger, the "typical" circumstance of the emotion being felt, exists.

I feel that this argument not only provides a very powerful response to Carroll's article, but rings true to human emotions and mentality. This thesis can clearly apply not only to horror, but to tragedy. It successfully removes the seeming paradox of the enjoyment of these "negative" emotions by a critical evaluation of the circumstances under which these emotions are felt.

To end with a question: Gaut casually throws out, on page 320, that "the majority of horror works lack any serious artistic worth. They are pure entertainment." This seems to suggest that art does not entertain, or, at the very least, that something that is meant purely to entertain cannot have any artistic merit. Is this the case? Or have I misinterpreted this passage?

The Benefits of Fiction

Jacob asked: "Since we can suffer by exposure to certain fictions and non-fiction, can we equally benefit from others?"

I think the answer to this question is a resounding "yes." The Greeks performed tragedies for just this purpose. The audience would watch the play, and though they all know the story, they would feel for the characters. With this act of empathy, at the close of the play, the audience would experience a "catharsis," a cleansing of the emotions.

In my own experience, and the experiences of others I have talked to, reading fiction and watching movies does just this. They serve as outlets for us to come to grips with our emotions. Action movies appeal to the instinct for violence, and suppress it, allowing us to experience the carnage through the characters so we do not have to. Romance novels and movies stand as surrogates for passion, allowing us to experience with the characters the thrill of pursuing a lover, the bitterness of rejection, and the final sweetness of finding true love. Horror movies allow us to face our fears, give us license to be scared in a society where showing fear is seen as a sign of weakness.

These emotions that we feel are real, and the medium of fiction grants us a safe outlet through which to release our emotions so we are not overwhelmed by them. These emotions are real, and that, in part, explains why we enjoy them so much. They give us a sense of relief to have been able to express these emotions in a socially acceptable outlet.

To end with a (completely unrelated) question: Might video games be considered potential works of art?

Dawn Phillips' Article

I did a bit of research this evening after I was reminded of the incredibly disappointing article by Dawn Phillips. I found this: http://www.dawnphillips.co.uk/Publications%20pdf%20files/Dawn%20M%20Phillips%20-%20The%20real%20challenge%20for%20an%20aesthetics%20of%20photography.pdf



I was rather surprised when I read this. The article included in our book is considered an "excerpt," but I do not think these two pieces are comparable. In the full version above, Phillips makes an actual (and, I think, rather good, if not complete) argument for photography actually being an art form.

Granted, the full article feels more like an outline for a potential argument than an argument in and of itself, but the full piece seems, to me, to be much stronger than the "excerpt" printed in our book (even if it is still lacking).

To end with a question: why do you suppose the authors of our textbook chose to print the version of Phillips' article that appears in our textbook, rather than the version presented above?

Photographic Representation

One point I particularly took issue with from Scruton is his claim that photographs cannot represent anything. I submit, therefore, this photograph, paradigmatic of the Great Depression:



On it's face, it seems to be simply an image. But it is more than that. It is a representation of the spirit of the times. The woman's expression as she stares off into the distance, her abject depression, is representative of the feel that there was no end in sight of the hard times that had befallen America. The two children hide their heads from the camera, because there is no silver lining to the dark cloud of the depression. Their faces are hidden; they do not wish to look upon the dark prospects of the future.

This photograph, and it IS a photograph, is certainly representative. It was the photographer's intention to capture this spirit of the time. Therefore, Scruton's claim that photography "cannot represent anything" seems to fly right in the face of the truth in actual photography -- the truth that photography CAN, and DOES, represent things beyond the objects pictured, in the same way that a painting can and does represent something outside of itself.

To end with a question: Given this example against Scruton's definition of an "ideal photograph," and the fact that his argument was based entirely on his "ideal examples," does Scruton's argument still hold true?

Scruton's Definition of Photography

Scruton takes a position that, I think, is self-defeating. It is such in that his definition of photography is too narrow.

Scruton claims that photography is simply the act of taking the picture. Anything that comes before or after that is the manipulation of photography, and thus not photography. The issue comes when he tries to draw his analogy to painting.

Before a painter can paint, there is some necessary prep work that MUST BE DONE. The canvas must be prepared, and perhaps primed. The paints need to be mixed while working, and even after, there is some fine editing to be done before a painting is truly complete. These, I think, would be the analogues to the preparation of a setting for a photograph and later editing on the image.

I would like to believe that Scruton does not confuse the final product of painting with the entire act of painting. If this is the case, than rejecting the analogues to the processes required to make a painting and calling this the "ideal photograph" is at best a blind mistake, and at worse manipulation of the facts, selectively ignoring facts to build a world view that is entirely independent of, and contrary to, reality.

I feel that his argument is the equivalent of comparing apples and oranges. Scruton writes off some properties of oranges, uses others to show that an orange is not an apple, and then concludes that an orange is not a fruit, but an apple is, based solely on the grounds that an orange is not an apple. This is a flawed argument to make, and discounts the properties that apples and oranges share, i.e. growing on trees, containing seeds, having an edible flesh surrounding the seeds, etc.

To end with a question: As mentioned in class, when trying to use an ideal to make a point, there is the real risk of using a wrong example and taking the essence of that as the ideal. Given this danger, is there any practical value in trying to use an ideal as the basis of an argument to discredit the real world?

"Levels" of Art

Jacob asked the following: "Telfer attributed food as a minor art, and Scruton thinks that photography is a lesser art form. Are there levels of art? Are some forms inherently better than others or is all art, or rather, all artforms equal?"

The simple answer is, "no." For a longer answer... there are numerous difficulties with this idea of a "lesser" versus "greater" arts.

For one, it is presumptuous to pick out particular art forms and say that one is better than another. Each different art form has a different tradition, and look for different aspects, so in a sense, trying to categorize "lesser" and "greater" art is like comparing apples to oranges. They're both fruit, but there's no way to argue that one is "better" than another.

Another difficulty is that there is such variation within different artistic "types." For example, I would argue that John Cage's 4'33 is certainly less accomplished than, say, Vivaldi's Four Seasons. It seems ludicrous, therefore, to consider a "song" where the musician merely sits at the piano for 4 minutes and 33 seconds would necessarily be a better work of art than, say, a photograph, simply because John Cage's piece is "music," and thus a "greater" art than the "lesser art" of photography.

Given this large variation of skill, it is absurd to try to differentiate art forms as "greater" or "lesser." Rather, I would suggest that art works be judged solely on their merit, lest we mistake a poor piece of one type of art to be better than a great piece of a different type simply because of the types of art these works are examples of.

To end with a question: Is Scruton justified in his use of "Ideal examples" to build his case against photography?

NaNoWriMo

This will not be one of my two posts for the week for aesthetics. I just wanted to put in a quick advertisement for National Novel Writing Month (NaNoWriMo). Granted, it's already started, but it's not too late yet, if you can play catch up, and it's a fun experience for anyone (not just writers!).

http://www.nanowrimo.org/

The object of NaNoWriMo is to write a 50,000 word novel in 30 days, just to prove you can. I highly recommend you all look in to it. It's quite fun. I won in 2008, and am participating again this year. Good luck to anyone who tries this with me!

Aesthetics of Nature

I feel that Jacob's post on aesthetics and the aesthetic appreciation of nature fairly well encapsulates my own view on the aesthetic appreciation of nature, so I will not go in to detail in that here. In sum, his argument is, "aesthetic responses are emotional responses to what we see," therefore when we have an emotional response to our perception of nature, it is an aesthetic response. I would like to use this post to suggest something that Carlson found problematic: we do not know what to appreciate aesthetically in regards to nature.

I believe that this question is a very simple one to answer. It can be answered thus: whatever sense is most useful at the time. This may seem vague, but a few examples should serve to illustrate the point.

Let us take the classic example of the waterfall to begin with. Part of the aesthetic experience would certainly be seeing it. The act of watching the water rushing ever downwards can be quite an emotional ride. It is compounded by the sound, the mighty roar of the water as it cascades downward. Feel, scent, and perhaps even taste may come in to play depending on distance from the base, as a result of the mist that sometimes rises up at the base of waterfalls.

For another example, take a walk through the woods. Part of the aesthetic experience is, again, visual, in terms of the flora and fauna that one may spot on the trail. Aural comes in to play through experiences such as the rustle of leaves by a breeze, or the song of birds. The air itself can provide an aesthetic experience, if it is clean. Feel can come through touching trees along the way, or simply from the act of walking on the often soft ground of a forest.

A favorite example of mine is lying in a yard cloud-gazing. The visual experience is, of course, looking up at the sky. Aural experience can be in the same vein as the forest -- breeze and birdsong, for example. The physical experience is the feel of the grass on one's back, perhaps the feel of bugs crawling across the skin, or the warmth of the sun's light.

In all cases, it is not particularly difficult to find which sense to use. It is simply a matter of being open to receiving the stimuli that nature has to offer. There need be no "set in stone" way to aesthetically appreciate nature.

To end with a question: Do we really need to "know" how to aesthetically appreciate something?

Performing Arts and Performances

Jacob asked: "is there a way to distinguish a performing art from the performance? Can a dance exist without being danced?"

This question brings up some intriguing discussion points, particularly where morality stands. As I may have made clear before, my own view on morality is that an art object is amoral, as only actions can have a moral aspect to them. This would seem to imply that there is, in fact, a way for a performance, as an action, to be moral or immoral.

I do not believe that this is the case, that a performance can be moral or immoral. After all, a performance is merely the acting out of directions given by another. The particular actions of a performer while performing may be immoral, but this does not make the performance itself immoral.

How can this distinction be made? A performance is a presentation of a work of art. In this sense, the performance itself is no different than the display of a painting or sculpture. It is a unique presentation in and of itself, and is therefore just as much an amoral object for aesthetic appreciation as the painting or sculpture.

The question of improvisation falls in to this same category. It is a display of a work of art, and is, in and of itself, amoral. I shall return to this later in regards to Jacob's second question.

However, the particular actions of a performer can be moral or immoral, just as the affects of a work on an audience can be moral or immoral while keeping the piece itself amoral. If, for example, a play calls for the rape of a character, and the actor playing the rapist, during the performance, actually rapes the actor playing the rape victim, this particular action on the part of the actor playing the rapist is immoral, but this does not make the play, or the performance, immoral.

What of improvisation in terms of Jacob's second question? "Can a dance exist without being danced," or, in a similar vein, can an improvised jazz performance exist without being performed? The simple answer to this is, "yes, it can." However, it is not a work of art until it is performed. In the same way, a painting can exist in the artist's mind, but it does not exist as a work of art until the artist actually paints it.

To end with a question: Does the intention behind a work to act as a stimulant for a particular response, i.e. emotional or physical, preclude the possibility that it has aesthetic and artistic merit?

Does Philosophy Help Us "See?"

Professor Yake brought up what I found to be an interesting point in Wednesday's class: the idea that philosophy should help us "see," in a literal sense.

My initial reaction to this was, "anyone with two functioning eyes can 'see' just fine, thank you. Philosophy helps us interpret what we see, and find the meaning in and behind the visual stimuli. It helps us 'see' in the sense of understanding, as well it should."

But then I started thinking about this. Could training in perception be helpful? It is certainly a possibility. It may be quite useful to learn new ways of physically seeing things, in order to give us a new perspective from which to analyze and interpret that object. Is philosophy the subject that should concern itself with this? Perhaps. Though the question would then become, "how might we learn to 'see' differently?"

So, I beg the question: how might philosophy be able to teach us to "see?" Can it? Should it?

"Aesthetic Objects" and "Art Objects"

I would like to present, for your rational evaluation, a theory I have developed concerning "art objects" and "aesthetic objects."

An "aesthetic object" is any object which elicits an aesthetic, or emotional, response from the viewer.

An "art object" is an object created by a human being with the intention to elicit an aesthetic, or emotional, response from the viewer.

Under this theory, "art objects" is a sub-category of the larger category of "aesthetic objects." The implication is that, first and foremost, for an object to be considered an "art object," it must first pass the test of "aesthetic object." If the object in question does not elicit an emotional response from the viewer, it has failed as art, and therefore IS NOT art, regardless of the intentions of the creator.

Only when an art object passes the test of being an "aesthetic object," thus showing it possesses aesthetic qualities, can we then evaluate the work's merit as an "art object," which would include such aspects as the artist's intention, the technique, the originality of the piece, authenticity, etc. Key here is that high AESTHETIC merit does not necessarily translate in to high ARTISTIC merit. Thus, under this construction, a forgery can have equal aesthetic merit to the original which was copied, but the forgery would have significantly lower artistic value.

To be explicit with my ending question: What do you think of this construction? Does it have merit?

"Rational Morality," and Art

In today's class, Professor Yake brought up a very interesting point about "rational morality." I would like to comment on it here.

I like the implications behind this idea of "rational morality." It seems, to me, to speak to the idea that we should question all of our assumptions, and only keep those for which we can find a rational basis. This, to me, is a view of high merit, for anyone. There is never any harm in exploring the roots of our views and having a solid foundation for holding what values we do hold.

I think, however, that trying to then apply this "rational morality" to art gets rocky. Art, in my view, does not exist solely as an expression of morality or moral living. Rather, art can, and should, reflect the realities of our lives. This is extremely important, as often, we can be blind to the reality around us, and fail to notice the proverbial elephant in the room.

To illustrate this point of cultural blindness, I'll draw an example from a course I took over the summer. In our society today, heterosexuality is so pervasive in all strata of social functioning, that it is considered to be the "norm" by which we judge everything else. This manifests itself in many ways. A famous example are the "coming out stories" we expect of, for example, homosexuals. Heterosexuality is so prevalent that there need be no explanation for the "discovery" of one's heterosexuality, but society demands a story, a reason, for one's "homosexuality."

In the same vein of the "heterosexual invisible" would be the rituals of marriage. This concept of marriage, of the wife in a white dress, the father giving the bride to the husband, etc, is so ingrained in our cultural consciousness that many, if not most, people are unaware of the historical symbolism behind the symbolism. The white dress is a symbol of the bride's virginity (which is questionable in today's society, and almost certainly so in the case of remarriages). The father giving the bride away is representative of the social view of women as property -- a woman is her father's property until she is married, at which point she becomes her husband's property, making the entire marriage ceremony a celebration of what is, at its core, a financial transaction.

How does this all relate to art? Simple. Art can, and should, function to expose such things to our larger cultural consciousness. Art is a perfect vehicle for revealing these sorts of truths that have become lost to the culture, and thus a great potential catalyst for social change where change is needed.

Hooray for interdisciplinary analogies! :)

... and now that I've just used a smiley in a graded blog, I shall end with a question: Should art serve as a "mirror to society," revealing the flaws in our society that we are often unconscious of, or should art restrict itself to utopian depictions of "high morality?"

Art "Inducing Immorality," and Racism in Art

I'm going to be blogging like crazy this week. I can already see that.

I'm going to tackle the topics in my title in reverse order. First, "racism" in art. It was brought up today that, a while back, there was a cartoon which depicted Obama as a monkey. I would like to begin by pointing out the hundreds, if not thousands, of depictions of our previous president, George W. Bush, as a monkey. The man looks like one, and he's about as civilized as one. The point here is that political cartoons, to make a point, characterize politicians as animals. This is not new, and therefore I do not consider the cartoon in question to be anything other than politics, or political cartoons, as usual.

Does this make the political cartoons somehow reprehensible? Perhaps. But I would contest that despite this, the artist has a right to produce it, just as the viewers have the right to be offended by it. Anything beyond that goes in to dangerous territory.

So, tying in to the idea of art "inducing immorality..." Professor Yake brought up a hypothetical porn movie, but I would like to take a real-world example: the film "The Triumph of the Will." "The Triumph of the Will" is arguably one of the most famous, and successful, propaganda films in history. It portrays the rise of the Nazi party as a revitalization of Germany, and casts Hitler into an almost-Messianic role for the German people. It served to solidify Hitler's popularity in Germany, and secure his position as Fuhrer of the so-called 'Third Reich.'

It is no secret that Hitler commissioned the mass slaughter of millions of innocents. The propaganda film "The Triumph of the Will" was certainly a powerful tool in building popular support for a government and ideology that is near-universally accepted today as pure evil. There is no way a rational human being can honestly legitimize the murder of millions of innocents (numbers which, incidentally, included a large number of my own relatives on my paternal side). However, despite the fact that "The Triumph of the Will" glorified this government and the man who would ultimately unleash one of the most destructive wars of the twentieth century, can we really call the film itself "immoral?" I do not think this is the case.

Why? The intentions of the film maker may have been immoral -- the glorification of Hitler. Hitler's intentions were almost certainly immoral -- "Endlösung," or the Final Solution, a policy that lead to the murder of millions of Jews. This does not, however, impose this immorality on the film. An object is inherently amoral. Morality refers to actions, to conduct, and perhaps to a lesser extent to ideas, but cannot, and should not, be afixed to objects, art objects included.

To end with a couple of questions: 1) Does a common tactic in political cartoons become racist when the politician being lampooned happens to be of an "ethnic minority?" 2) Is there any way to legitimately apply moral judgments to human creations?

"Art" By Non-Human Beings

Betsy asked: Why do you think most human beings are so reluctant to consider the intentional artistic expression of mammals and birds as art?

To begin, I would consider "intentional artistic expression of non-human animals" to be a rather dubious claim. To our knowledge (or at least to mine), the one characteristic that differentiates humans from non-humans is the fact that humans are self-aware. We are aware of our own existence, and have the unique capability of projecting that awareness. This allows us to think rationally, to imagine things that are not real, to feel empathy for other beings. As far as I am aware, there is no evidence of any non-human animals possessing these mental capacities, at least to the extent to which we possess them.

One of the key elements of (human) artistic expression is the intention for the art to point to something beyond itself. We can look at a painting and not see it as paint on a canvas, but as representative of something beyond itself. If the painting is a landscape, for example, we can see the landscape in it, imagine it in our mind's eye, imagine being there. This is a mental capability that non-humans lack, to the best of our knowledge.

Because other animals do not have this mental capacity, it is therefore questionable that they could thus intentionally create an artwork. Imitation is not necessarily evidence of artistic intent. My not-insignificant knowledge of animal behavior leads me to the understanding that non-human animals lack the capacity for such purely artistic intention. They are driven by instinct, by genetic programming and learned behaviors that are used exclusively for the survival and perpetuation of the species. The "architectural structures" they produce are not intended to be artistic, but to be pragmatic, to provide shelter. The bird's song is not meant to be artistic, but to attract a mate so that the bird may reproduce. Their "found art" is not intended to be viewed and appreciated artistically, but again, solely as an avenue for attracting a mate.

Whether or not this is true may yet be proved false, but this is my understanding, and I am sure it is widely shared among humans. For these reasons, aestheticians are likely reluctant to conclude that animals are even capable of intentional artistic creation, let alone if their "creations" are worthy of artistic appreciation.

To end with a question (that I intend to later blog about): What are the differences between "aesthetic objects" and "art objects?" Or do such differences exist?

"Conceptual" Art.

I found an interesting op-ed on the New York Times today. You can read it here. Incidentally, it was written by Denis Dutton, whose work you may recall from our book.

I strongly recommend you read it all. It's a fascinating read. But the point I want to draw out of it is thus: this idea of "conceptual" art.

To put it in brief, paraphrasing Dutton, "conceptual" art seems to be a new trend in art. In "conceptual" art, the artist does not do any of the actual work in creating the piece. The artist merely comes up with the idea, and commissions someone else to do it, and then sells it for obscene profits.

The example Dutton cites is a new "work" by the artist Damien Hirst. It is merely a medicine cabinet stocked with the same sort of drugs anyone may have in their medicine cabinet. It is not something he made, like Warhol's Brillo boxes. It is merely an idea he conceptualized, had someone else assemble, and is attempting to sell for over $200,000.

This seems to me to be a betrayal of what "art" really means. As Dutton says in his article, "There is no place on earth where superlative technique in music and dance is not regarded as beautiful," and yet these "artists" use no skill at all in the creation of their works besides coming up with the idea.

This all leads to my question: is "conceptual" art "true" art, or is it a corruption of art?

Can an "authentic" musical performance be a forgery?

Jaimie asked "When discussing music, sticking as close to the original work as possible is key to an "authentic" performance, where as with more "physical" art (painting, sculpture, etc.) this can be considered a forgery. Does this mean that authentic performances could be forgeries?"

Before I address this question, I would like to once again bring in the distinction of the creative and performance arts. With the creative arts, it is not the process itself that is art, but the final product. With a performance, the process is just as much part of the art as the finished piece. I would go so far to argue that the score of a piece of music, the script for a play, etc, is an entirely separate piece of art from the actual performance of the song or play, as the musicians and actors bring as much vitality and creativity to the performance as the composers and playwrights brought to the production of the score or script.

Next, the question of a forgery must be addressed. By definition, a forgery is an object, a copy of another object produced with intent to deceive, to pass off the forgery as one's own, or as something genuine, as with money or art.

Given this definition, a performance cannot be a forgery. A performance is not an object -- it is an interpretation of the object. The score from which a piece of music is played could certainly be a forgery, but the performance itself would not be, even if the musician claimed to have written the piece. The score would certainly be a forgery, but the performance would not be.

To end with a question: Is there any link between music and morality, as Scruton suggested in "The Decline of Musical Culture?"

A Broken Record

Thinking back to class the other day, I apparently kept repeating Lessing's argument over and over in response to Dutton's. I realize this was unintentional, but I feel it is worth exploring.

Why would I, in responding to one argument, more or less cite the other? The answer is simple, really: the former argument failed, in my view, to adequately address the points of the other.

Dutton's argument, from what I got from it, amounted to little more than "the artist is important because it always has been, and that's how it should be." He explains WHY, but he never provides an adequate defense for why it SHOULD be the case, for why it SHOULD matter for our aesthetic appreciation. This is where I think his argument fails, and why Lessing's ultimately makes much more sense.

To end with a question: SHOULD the artist of a work affect our aesthetic judgment of a piece? Why or why not?

Ethics and Art: The Question of Pornography

The question of forgeries is undoubtedly a question of morals over merit. It does a disservice to the work to claim that a work is any less accomplished just because of its origins, or of the intent of the artist. But the question of morals is not unique to forgeries.

Many of the arguments pertaining to pornography do not even begin to consider any of the merits of the work. Pornography is written off as art not for any intrinsic value it has, but because of a moral judgment that pornography results in evil, i.e. lust, objectification of the person (particularly of women), or instigating sexual crimes. The arguments ignore any value that these works may have.

To show how ridiculous this is, allow me to take a couple of examples. James Joyce's novel, "Ulysses," was banned for a while in the United States because it was labeled pornography. It was banned despite its clear literary merit, and today it is considered a fine example of literature.

Another example of this is "The Story of O" (which was, incidentally, written by an upper class French woman). This, too, was banned for a time because of its fairly explicit descriptions of sadomasochism. It is now considered to have literary, and thus artistic, value, despite the heavy eroticism in the book.

The label itself of "pornography" becomes suspect, as it makes a judgment based on shifting moral values in society. One generations smut is the next generation's literature. It is therefore rather obvious that making such moral judgments about a work disregards any value the work may have. This is not to say that all such pieces are unjustly belittled, but that there are some for which the hasty denouncement causes we, the art-viewing public, to miss out on quality pieces of art.

For a closing question, I pose this: should any art be censored? Are there any qualities of a piece of art for which the piece can legitimately be censored?

Is Philosophy an Art? A Response to Betsy's Response

Philosophy is NOT a medium. To call philosophy a medium is akin to calling a hammer and chisel a sculpture. These are NOT the final product, but tools with which the final product is produced.

Furthermore, philosophy was not created as an art form. It was created as a particular method by which humans can discover some truth. To play with your quote from wikipedia, mythology purports to reveal the truth through stories about gods and heroes. Mysticism purports to reveal the truth by ritual and meditation. Philosophy uses logic and reason. They are different, distinct methods. Plus, some of the early Western philosophers would not take kindly the accusation of their discipline being an art. Plato in particular thought that art was inferior, a useless "copy of a copy," and that it had little, if anything, to offer humanity.

Where does art come in? Art and philosophy both seek to reveal some truth, in my view. However, they do so in different ways. Philosophy uses the pure mental faculties -- logic and reason. Art does not. Art uses symbolism and emotion to reach that truth. They are two separate, distinct disciplines, and while some philosophy can be considered art, that is not to say that philosophy itself IS an art.

Question: What elements distinguish art from every other thing in existence? What makes "art" art?

I now present, for your consideration...

... This.



And I shall beg the question: Is this art?

Defining "Art," and Is Philosophy Art?

In his blog, Jacob Wheeler asked the excellent question, "How do you define art?" I spent a good portion of Art & Philosophy trying to figure out how I would answer this question (as my posts for that class attest), but I will restate it here: Art is the Intentional exercise of Original Creative thought Expressing some Idea or Emotion in some Medium.

Intention indicates that there is an active, conscious effort by the artist to create a work of art. It doesn't "just happen."

Original, Creative thought indicates that the piece is unique. There is nothing else quite like it, and it is purely the product of the artist's imagination.

Expression of an Idea or Emotion indicates that art is a communicative act. It exists, not for itself (hence my hatred of some "modern art," "art" undertaken for "art's sake"), but for the viewer. It must share an Emotion or Idea.

The Medium is the route through which the Emotion or Idea is expressed. It can be the written word, marble, paint and canvas, or sound, but whatever it is, it is something that can be perceived by the viewer, and thus completes the communication of the art.

Now that I have defined "art," I will address the question Betsy posed: "Is philosophy an art?"

I will not argue that philosophical works could certainly be works of art. There is no reason that a work filled with philosophical undertones could not be a grand work of art. But is the subject itself art? I do not believe so. Philosophy can certainly be expressed in art, but I would not call the subject itself art. When philosophy is expressed in a medium, it then has the potential to be art, but only if there is the CONSCIOUS INTENTION of the philosopher/artist that it BE a work of art. Lacking this intention, a philosophical work is not also a work of art.

To end with a question: What value, if any, is there in an "authentic" musical performance, or is it merely a matter of differing tastes?

Oh, Aesthetics Class... You Amuse Me.

I know not how many of you bloggers are blogging for credit, but I would like to point out something I find rather humorous: there appear to have been more responses to my questions than to any questions posed by anyone else, a tad absurd when you take into account the fact that I do this for my own intellectual exercise rather than for a grade.

Since, as previously stated, this blog is ungraded, I shall turn my attention to a less tasteful topic: the topic of pornography. Yes, pornography. Given that I have virtually no social life, I have begun to do research relating to the thesis of my research paper -- that thesis being that pornography is art.

This is doubtless going to be a contentious issue. I will readily admit that some pornography, particularly that which is so widely available on the internet, is distasteful, vulgar, unpleasant to look at. In my own travels across the internet, I have come across things that cannot be unseen, however much I desire to unsee these awful... things. Does this discount it as art? Perhaps, but perhaps not.

It would, of course, be quite difficult to have a discussion about pornography without at least touching upon the sensitive moral issues surrounding it. There are myriad arguments surrounding the ethical issues that pornography presents us with, but I will, to the best of my ability attempt to steer clear of these in order to focus in on the aesthetic value of pornography. We shall soon see if this is even possible.

I will, of course, refrain from posting links to pornography within my blog as I delve in to this question. It is far from my intention to offend anyone. I will, however, trace the course of my thesis here as I explore the topic, and quite possibly pose questions that I come across in an attempt to get a wide variety of perspectives on the issue and thus assist in the writing of my paper.

To end, I shall leave a discussion question related to class today: What is the practical value in distinguishing "major" art forms from "minor" art forms, if there is one?

My Thoughts on Sections to Read or Skip from the Book

As I do not maintain this blog for credit, I will editorialize and input my thoughts on which sections we should read from the book, as Professor Johnson did note that he was uncertain about the readings we would undertake for this course.

To begin, I would like to propose skipping the Rock Music section, and possibly the section on the "Authentic" Performance of Music. This in no way reflects disdain for music (I am a musician myself). It is merely a reflection of the fact that the philosophy department does, at times, offer a course specifically on the Philosophy of Music, which could, in theory, address the question of music much more in-depth than this general course could.

I feel that the Fakes and Forgeries section is a must for this course. Just thinking back to a few discussion in Art & Philosophy, the idea of forgeries is indeed quite contentious, and we would be remiss to skip out on discussing this particular aspect of aesthetics.

Appreciation, Understanding, and Nature, I believe, would address another contentious aspect of aesthetics, specifically, the role of nature as art, or if indeed nature is art.

I feel that we should skip the sections on photography and horror. While these could most certainly be interesting areas to explore, they feel to me too specific for a more general course like this one, particularly with the limited amount of time we have (one semester is quite short).

A discussion of art is nothing without emotion. Thus, the sections on Feelings and Fictions and Sentimentality seem to be vital to our discussions of art, for how can one discuss art while overlooking the emotional impact of a piece, particularly those that are meant to specifically draw out certain emotions from the viewer?

The pornography and erotica section strikes me as, again, one of those too specialized fields to explore in this short, more general course. As it would be impossible to explore this topic without getting in to the muddy waters of ethics and morality (or, as some claim, the innate immorality of the production and consumption of pornography), it could derail the discussion of the purely aesthetic properties of the work with an unrelated (and likely hotly contentious) discussion of morals and ethics that would be quite separate from any value such works may have.

The last two sections give me some pause. They both seem equally valid, considering such topics as the public endowment for the arts, and debates over whether, for example, tribal masks could count as art when that tribe has no concept of art. Time constraints lead me to believe that one or the other should not be included, though I am unsure which. As there are more articles in Public Art, I would suggest waiting to see how much time we have once we finish with the above sections, and depending on time constraints, select a last section then.

Of course, a simple fix to the question of which chapters to address could be the creation of PHIL 385, Aesthetics II, in the same vein as PHIL 385, Logic and Critical Reasoning II, and procede through the chapters as the book lays them out (or perhaps using the other section for the sections skipped from this course as I have laid out above).

All of the above is merely my suggestion for an equitable distribution of sections discussed to maximize the depth we can achieve in this course over the semester. This is solely my opinion.

To end off with a discussion question (in light of the lack of bloggers who appear to be active): What sections do you believe we should cover in this course and why?

Telfer's description of the art of food as "simple" and "minor"

I feel as though a lot was said today in class on the subject, but I did not have the opportunity to express any of my own opinions on what we were presented with. I shall attempt to rectify that situation here.

I felt that Telfer's argument for the "less refined" nature of smell and taste was rather weak, at least in biological terms. She seems to discount, and indeed forward, the common misconception that smell and taste and weaker, inferior senses to vision and hearing. This is not the case. Indeed, our senses of smell and taste are capable of many fine distinctions. Some could argue that the art of food is to combine flavors to create a whole greater than the sum of its parts.

We did not yet mention memory. One argument brought up in Telfer's article was that the memory of smell and taste is weaker than that of vision or hearing. This is false. It is a biological fact that smell is a powerful sense linked to memory, due perhaps in part to it having the shortest pathway to our brains. Smell may not be useful for remembering facts from a book, but it is undeniably linked, quite powerfully, to our memories.

As a final note, as this blog is not being kept for credit, I will take a moment to editorialize. I was always under the impression that in a discussion-based college seminar, there would be a tad more civility in the classroom, particularly in regards to making comments. I do not appreciate raising my hand, making eye contact with the professor, and then having someone else start talking before I get the chance to open my mouth. It is rude, disrespectful, and to be frank, I find it quite frustrating. I hate to be the one to harken back to high school, but it is extremely rare for me to find something that frustrates me this much this early in a class. (This last paragraph may later be removed, at Professor Johnson's request.)

I shall close with a discussion question: in the section "Works of Art," Telfer describes the two different ways in which the term "work of art" is commonly used, specifically, as a classifying or evaluative term. Should the term be used in both senses, or is it more appropriate to use one sense over the other exclusively?

Greetings to my classmates in Aesthetics

Greetings, all! As is likely apparently, this is a revival of my Art & Philosophy blog. All previous posts are from that class. Feel free to browse them if you have time or interest, but otherwise they are of little use to you, or to this class.

I feel it is only fair to point out that I will not be keeping my blog updated regularly. I have opted to write a paper, and will only be actually posting on this blog when it strikes my fancy. I will be reading your blogs, however (and possibly commenting), and feel more than free to comment on, or respond to, any posts I may make during the term.

Best of luck to the bloggers!